T he significant growth of the hedge funds industry in the past decade has heen supplemented by increased allocations to alternative investments by high-net-worth individuals as well as endowments and foundations. In recetit years, there has been a steady shift in pension plan investment strategies toward aiternative investments and/or hedge funds. For example. Ma.ssachusetts Pension Reserve Investment Managetnent in 2()0f) allocated 5.1% of its $41.9 billion plan to hedge funds. Previous studies, e.g., Kat [2005] ; Till [2005|; Amenc. Giraud. Martcllini. atid Vaissie [2004] ; Coleman and Mansour |2()()5|; Amenc and Martellini [2002] ; Brunei [2()04 [; and Lamm [2005[ have addressed the issue of including hedge funds in a standard portfolio in a mean-variance optimization framework. This article presents an optimization methodology that takes into account various quantifiable risks of portfolios with hedge funds.
The Markowitz tnean-variance approach was introduced in the early 1950s as a rational tool to help guide decisions in portfolio allocation. One of its basic assumptions is that the investor's objective is defmed as the trade-off between mean return and risk measured by variance of return. This methodology has been used to determine what is often considered as the baseline asset allocation: 60% stocks and 40% bonds.' Thus, if the investor's objective is to maximize return per unit of risk, the investor can use the mean-variance approach for portfolio allocatioti. This approach is less useful, however, if the investor's preference is different from the mean-variance criterion or if the return series is not normally distributed, as in the case of hedge funds.
Regarding investors' criteria for optimal portfolios, several alternative objectives have been proposed, including the minimax ratio, the mean absolute deviation ratio, and the Sortino ratio (Sharpe [1994|; Young [I998[; Sortino [2000[; and Uryasev [2000[). In addition, previous studies have considered higher moments of the return distribution in the portfolio optimization setup. For instance, Lamm [2005] uses the Cornish-Fisher approximation in an optimization where the objective function is modified value-at-risk that incorporates asymmetry explicitly. His objective function penalizes portfolios whose return distributions have negative skewness and excess kurtosis.
Return distributions of traditional asset classes, e.g., stocks and bonds, have been studied extensively. Previous studies suggest that traditional asset return series arc close to noriTuil. and thus they can be well-characterized simply by their mean and standard deviation. In contrast, hedge funds typically have nonnormal return distributions marked by significant negative skewness and excess kurtosis (Ainiii and Kat [2003[ and Lo [2001] ).-Since mean-variance models igtiore these higher moments of the return distribution, they fail to provide comfort to risk-averse investors who are concerned about these moments and the convincing arguments that hedge funds not be included in a traditional balanced portfolio. In brief, mean-variance models penalize funds that occasionally have surprises on the upside while underestimating the risk ot the funds that have asymmetric downside risk. While it is widely recognized that hedge fund returns are not normally distributed, many investors still rely on the mean-variance optimization framework. Amenc, Giraud, MarteUini, and Vaissie [2004] report that 84% of European multi-manager funds consider volatility to be a major concern of their clients and 82% consider the Sharpe ratio an important indicator. In contrast, only 2% of the European multi-managers pay attention to skewness and kurtosis, and only 13% have integrated an extreme risk measure and scenarios on extreme market conditions.
In addition to the non-normal return distributions associated with individual hedge funds, inherent biases in the hedge fund databases present fiarther complications for measuring their performance (Ackermann, McEnally, and Ravencraft [1999] ; Brown, Goetzmann, and Ibbotson [1999] ; Fung and Hsieh [2000] ; and Liang [2000] ).
These inherent biases stem from the lack of consistency and rigor in the collection of hedge fund data. First, returns are likely to be biased upward as a result of "instant histories," survivor biases, and self-selection biases inherent in the hedge fund indices. The composition ot many indices is solely dependent on which funds choose to have their data listed in a database. When a fund chooses to list, it typically brings 18 to 24 months of "instant history," and most likely a good history, into the database. If the performance of the fund has not been good, the fund may choose to stop reporting to the database. Should these funds be dropped from the database, the index return would be upwardly biased, since the surviving funds in the database and index would have performed well.
On the other hand, some of the larger and more successful funds may choose not to list because they no longer want to accept new investors, and so their performance is not included in the database. Thus, the performance of the index may not be accurately reflected due to these survivor and self-selection biases.'^ Moreover, if the better-performing funds are closed to new investors but are still included in the index, the index itself may not be truly investable. As such, the potential benefit of hedge funds in terms of return as represented by hedge fnnd indices can be inaccurate.
While various factors and biases may increase the observed returns of hedge funds, their volatilities are likely to be reported lower than actual as a result of autocorrelation (Brooks and Kat [2002] , and Getmansky, Lo, and Makarov 12004] )."* The combination of higher observed return and lower observed standard deviation is the primary driver of the allocation to hedge funds in meanvariance optimization, which results in a higher Sharpe ratio. Ignoring the skewness and kurtosis characteristics, mean-variance models can be expected to over-allocate to hedge funds.
Although previous studies have attempted to adjust for the impact of higher moments, alternative objectives, stale pricing, and rebalancing frequency on the optimal allocation to hedge funds, many restrictive assumptions used in mean-variance optimization remain unnecessary. Advances in optimization methodologies used in the fields of transportation, communications, and manufacturing in the past decade, combined with Monte Carlo simulation techniques and the rapid advances in computing power in recent years, have created new powerful means to help make optimal decisions under uncertainty (see, e.g., Pflug [1996] and Ruszczyhski and Shapiro [2003] ). In this article, we use a new method that combines simulation and optimization to solve for a variety of benchmark-based investment objectives that are of interest to portfoho managers. The simulation techniques discussed in the Methodology section provide input, i.e., simulated paths from the hedge fund returns distribution, to the optimization model and allow it to capture information contained in the skewness and kurtosis of the non-normal return distribution.
Thus, in contrast to the approaches used in previous studies, we use not only the sample moments, but also the whole distribution. This flexibility allows us to better address the special issues of hedge fund allocation within a standard portfolio. We demonstrate that aUocation to hedge funds within a traditional institutional portfolio may be optima! and rational even when individual hedge funds have undesirable skewness and kurtosis. In addition, we show that the mean-variance objective under the assumption of normal return distribution can be solved by our new methodology as a special case.
In this article, we focus on the optimization methodology that specifically takes the quantifiable risks of portfolios with hedge Rmds into consideration. The risks of hedge funds, however, may come from different sources which may not be captured by sucb quantitative measures as the standard deviation and downside deviation. In cases where standard deviations or other quantitative measures do not reflect all the other risks the funds face, e.g., operational risks as in the case of Bayou, due diligence on enterprise risk is of paramount importance. As Iong as a risk is quantifiable and of concern to the investor, it should be incorporated in the optimization. Our article attempts to do this with semi-variance, skewness, and kurtosis.
The rest of this article is organized as follows. We begin by presenting the optimization model for utility maximization. Then, we discuss further methodology and study the impact of including hedge tlinds in a standard porttblio. Next, we examine who would and would not invest in hedge funds. The article's penultimate section demonstrates how our methods can be used to construct . 1 tund of funds, and finally, the article is concluded.
OPTIMIZATION MODEL FOR UTILITY MAXIMIZATION
While the traditional objective of maximizing riskadjusted returns is appRipriate in many situations, investors otlen have other preferences. For instance, an institution may want to increase the probability that it can achieve a specific benchmark return in order to meet the liabilities of its pension plan, or it may want to minimize the need to make additional contributions to the plan.
Problems that fmd optimal allocation with respect to a set of constrains by taking into account the uncertainty of the underlying asset returns are known as stochastic programs. We formally introduce such a problem as follows.
We denote the utility function as U {X, (b). An investor faced with uncertain returns can choose from a universe of assets, where X = (Xp X,, • •., XJ denotes their random returns. The asset allocation problem is to determine the proportion of funds to be invested in each asset. Portfolio weights are denoted as ft> = (ftJ, , (0^, ..., (Oj,  where OJe W. These constraints can include linear, quadratic, and other types of constraints, such as a cardinality' constraint, which requires the model to select a limited number of assets with nonzero weights.
Putting the components together, the generic problem (optimizing over one period) can be expressed as tbllows: s.t.
M' Comtraint Adtiitioiial Comfmints
This generic optimization model can be refined to express more specific objectives or preferences. In this article, we focus on benchmark-related investment objectives. First, if we are interested in maximizing the probability of outperibrming a benchmark, r, the problem can be expressed in terms of maximizing expected utility as follows:
where / denotes the indicator function, which takes a value of 1 if the event in parentheses occurs and 0 otherwise. This model is equivalent to maximizing probability of achieving the benchmark:
(1) Second, a different objective is to minimize expected shortfall, that is, to minimize the average size of shortfall relative to the benchmark r. In utility terms, this is expressed as:
Third, compound objectives can also be established for the model. Combining (1) and (2) above, the investor's objective might be to maximize the probability of outperforming a benchmark, and at the same time wanting to limit the average amount by which she would underperforni the benchmark. The model with this combined objective can be formulated as:
Model (3) represents the objective of an investor who has two benchmarks:
1. r, is the benchmark she wants to outperform, for example, the return of the S&P 500, and 2. r-, is the benchmark she does not want to fall below, for example zero or the riskfree rate.
The value of A. > 0 represents the priority, i.e., the weight, placed on the second objective. By varying that weight, we can obtain a frontier in much the same way one constructs the mean-variance efficient frontier by varying the desired expected return or the risk-aversion parameter of the investor. However, the axes for this frontier are the probability of outperformance and size of the average shortfall.
METHODOLOGY
Models (1), (2), and (3) in the previous section are one-period stochastic programming problems. They can be solved exactly if X has a small number of scenarios, or if X is from a normal distribution, in which case the problems can be simplified to deterministic nonlinear programming problems.
It Xhas a continuous non-normal distribution or a discrete distribution with many scenarios, then it is usually not possible to simplify the stochastic program and solve it exactly. The only available approach is to solve the problem approximately. Asset allocation with hedge funds present, which generally involves both non-normal distributions and a continuous range of potential returns, is such a stochastic programming problem. Thus, we need to solve the problem approximately.
One standard approach for approximately solving a stochastic programming problem is to use Monte Carlo sampling procedures. This method uses computer programs to randomly generate /V observations of X from its distribution, and then solves the approximate stochastic program using that information. This procedure, for a specific value of N, can be replicated in order to construct an "upper bound" estimate of the optimal expected utility value."" That this is an upper bound is clear when N = 1. In this case, we can effectively "see the future" because having just one scenario, we know, with certainty, the exact values of the asset friture returns. Knowing the future return values gives us an advantage in deciding on the optimal allocation. For example, if we know with certainty that the value of one of the two assets will be higher than the other in the investment opportunitry set, we will allocate all of our investment to that asset.
The optimization model will exploit that and result in an optimistic estimate of, say, the probability of achieving the benchmark.
When N> 1, the optimization model can still exploit the fact that X takes on only N values instead of a continuum of values from its underlying distribution. The portfolio weights will adapt to these N scenarios and again result in an upper bound on the model's optimal utility value, on average. As N grows, the upper bound becomes less optimistic and converges to the "true" value (King and Jensen [1992] and Ruszczyhski and Shapiro [2003] ).
In reality, we do not "see the future." Since we do not know the future returns with certainty, when we choose any portfolio weights, ft), which may not be optimal, and use Monte Carlo simulation to generate a large number of possible returns, we obtain estimates of the portfolio performance. Since the weights may not be the optimal ones, the performance estimates will represent a lower bound on the true optimal value. This is a lower bound estimate because we first choose one permissible set of weights and then simulate the performance of that solution with previously "unseen" return realizations.
By taking the two bounds into account, we can construct a confidence interval on the optimality gap (the difference between the optimal value of the objective function, z", and the value for a given solution vector, (O). This confidence interval represents a statement on the quality of the solution, fi). By choosing CO with N realizations and then simulating its performance with another set of return scenarios, we can ensure the optimality gap shrinks to zero as N grows. We empirically examine this convergence, as well as that of the solution vector, 0), in the following section.
Convergence of the Approximate Solution
Stochastic programs address decision-making with uncertainty on the model's data parameters. As we discussed, some stochastic programs can be solved only approximately. To test such methodologies, we run a large number ot scenarios for a case with specified distributions, for example, a normal distribution. The results of the sequence of tests are then compared with an exact solution found using the methodology by Mak, Morton, and Wood (MMW) [1999|. They deinonstrate that as the number of scenarios increases, the lower and upper bounds on the objective function should converge toward the true optimal value.'' To demonstrate our methodology and the convergence of the approximate solution using the MMW methodology as applied to a portfolio, we look at a universe of six asset classes proxied by: S&P 500, Lehman brothers Aggregate Bond Index (LehAGG), Citigroup World Bond Index, Morgan Stanley Capital International Emerging Markets Free Index (MSCI EMF), Morgan Stanley Capital International Europe, Australasia and the Far East (MSCI EAFE) index, and EACM hedge flind index. We assume that the underlying true distribution is normal JV (Z:X, 2); the expected return, HX (the vector with the expected values of the asset classes); and the covariance matrix, S, is also known. As an example, we use the historical returns and covariance matrix for the six asset classes:Ê X = (15.8%,8.3%,6.5%,44.3%,9.1%.15.2%) "l.9I% 0.21% 0.15% 1.68% 1.33% 0.26%' When the returns come from a multivariate normal distribution with known parameters, and the objective function is to maximize probability of outperforming a fixed benchmark, the optimal portfolio is the one that maximizes the inlbrmation ratio. For illustration, we make typical assumptions: the fixed benchmark is 10%, short selling is not allowed, and the sum of the weights must cqu.il one. Solving the above quadratic programming problem, the resulting optimal portfolio is:
Since normality is assumed, Popova, Morton, and Popova [20061 show that the probability of outperforniance can be computed "exactly" as follows:
where 0 denotes the standard normal cumulative flinction.
We use this methodology to solve two sequences of approximate stochastic programs using the same data to establish the upper and lower bounds. We test the methodology with 100, 250, 500. and 1,000 scenarios against the "true probability" as computed analytically above. Results are presented in Exhibit 1.
In Exhibit 1, the lower and upper bounds both converge on the "true" probability (92.88%) as the number of scenarios increases. In addition, the size of the 99% confidence interval on the optimality gap decreases from almost 3% to less than \% as the number of scenarios increases.
One can expect to see convergence not only in the value function, that is, the probability of outperfbrmance, but also in the solution space. Exhibit 2 illustrates this convergence behavior. As the number oi scenarios increases, the optimal allocation converges toward the "true" solution in the analytical solution column.
The above illustration shows that this approximation approach produces results very close to the "true" optimal results under known cases.
Effect of Investor Preferences
Next, we show the impact of different investor preferences on the optimal results obtained from our methodology as compared to those fiom the standard mean-variance approach.
Suppose we have two assets whose distributions have the same mean {\%) and standard deviation (4%) but different higher moments in Exhibit 3." We also assume that the two assets are not highly correlated. Since the correlation between Asset 1 and Asset 2 is so small, the optimal mean-variance portfolio will comprise approximately 50% of Asset 1 and 50% of Asset 2.
Assume the investors objective is to maximize the probability of having positive returns, and at the same time she is very averse toward having returns below -5%. If she chooses to use the standard mean-variance approach, independent of her benchmark objectives, her optimal allocation will remain 50%)-5()%i. Just by looking at the densities of the assets, it is clear that depending on the objective, one should hold either more of Asset 1 or Asset 2. For example, if the objective is to have positive returns, then Asset 2 is the natural choice. On the other hand, if the objective is to be protected from enormous negative returns, the natural choice is Asset 1 (Asset 2 can produce large negative returns with a very small probability). This scenario begs for an optimal trade-off between the preferences. Our approach can identify the optimal combination of assets depending on the objective. Applying the methodology described in the previous section to model (3) with r, -0% and r, --5% and varying the values for X, we produce an efficient frontier shown in Exhibit 4, where risk and return are defined as the expected shortfall with respect to -5% and the probability of having positive returns, respectively.
The lowest point on the frontier corresponds to a portfolio (62%-38%) that is very averse toward falling below -5%. Hence the optimal allocation puts more weight on Asset 1, i.e., avoiding the possibility of a large negative return that could occur when holding Asset 2. The highest point on the frontier corresponds to a portfolio (20%-80%) that is very aggressive in achieving positive returns, hence a higlier allocation to Asset 2. We enhance performance in two directions: by considering the asymmetric return distribution and asymmetric utility function.
It is noted that the mean-variance allocation is a special case of our approach; the mean-variance efficient portfoho (50%-50%) is also on the frontier.
INCLUDING HEDGE FUNDS IN A STANDARD PORTFOLIO
Before applying our methodology which captures the full value of the information contained in both tails of the non-normal distribution of hedge fund returns, let's consider a simple mean-variance optimization using EXHIBIT tlie data from three asset classes. We use the same U.S. equity and U.S. long-term bonds data that generated the 6()%-40% portfolio discussed in endnote 1. For hedge funds, we use the monthly returns ot the CSFB/Tremont Hedge Fund Index for the period 1993-2005. The historical characteristics for the three asset classes are presented in Exhibit 5.
As expected, the mean-variance model is not helpful with the inclusion of hedge funds. The high Sharpe ratio for the hedge flmds causes them to dominate the allocation. The optimal mean-variance portfolio generated using data from Exhibit 5 has 0% in stocks, 8.8% in bonds, and 91.2% in bedge funds. While mathematically correct, a 91.2% allocation to hedge funds would not be considered practical. In fact, by consideringjust the mean and variance for each asset class, we ignore much valuable information contained in the monthly return scries. As we saw earlier, the normality assumption is reasonably appropriate for the equity and bond returns. It is, however, far fix)m appropriate for hedge fund returns. Moreover, as discussed above, hedge flind index data suffer from survivor bias (Fung and Hsieh | ]999|) that intiates returns and autocorrelations that reduce the observed volatility (Brooks and Kat [2()02|).'' In order to mitigate problems associated with these biases, we systematically concoct a less optimistic return sample with more reasonable parameters for the mean return and volatility of hedge funds that incorporates the higher moments. This new data set incorporates a healthy pessimism to challenge the highly optimistic allocation seen in the meanvariance analysis.
For our simulated return distribution, w^e assume a mean return of 9.0% for the hedge funds. This adjusts for some survivor bias found in the hedge fund index returns by Fung and Hsieli [1999| and others. In terms of risk. Brooks and Kat [2002] suggest that the elimination of the autocorrelation effects of hedge fund returns would increase the volatility by up to 60%. Our own Bayesian estimate of risk suggests a standard deviation close to 9.0'Xi. In terms of higher moments, we assume a skewness of-1 and a kurtosis of 6 based on the historical distributions of hedge fund index returns. Then, we use a mixture of two normal distributions to create a distribution that has the above four target moments. Last, solving a nonlinear system of equations gives us the values for the parameters of the mixture of distributions. The corresponding two normal distributions for the hedge funds and the resulting density plots for tlie three asset classes are presented in Exhibit 6.
Exhibit 6a shows the two normal distriburions. Distribution 1 represents "steady state" returns when trading strategies arc basically workmg as intended. It is characterized by a normal distribution with a mean return of 14.9% and a volatihty of 6.2%. Distribution 2 incorporates event risks or shocks to the steady state returns, and is a normal distribution with a mean return of-15.5%i and a volatility of 14.2%. Exhibit 6b shows the combined density for the simulated hedge fund returns. It is created by assigning an 81% probability to returns coming from Distribution 1 and 19% to those from Distribution 2. This could be thought of as if once in every five months there is a strategy failure, such as deal breaks for merger arbitrage, equity market corrections for long-short strategies, and extraordinary interest rate volatility. Exhibit 6c shows the densities for the three asset classes. We use normal distributions for the U.S. equity and U.S. long-term bonds and the simulated distribution for the hedge funds.
With the return distributions of the three asset classes delineated, we now consider incorporating hedge flmds into a traditional portfolio. We consider an investor who seeks to exceed a 12%i benchmark return as well as to avoid any losses for the portfolio overall. In our model, the investor's true objective is to maximize the probability of outperforming a benchmark, TJ -12%i, and her risk By varying A and solving for optimal portfoHos, we plot ;in (efficient frontier with a vertical axis sliowing the probability ot outpcrtorniing r^ and a horizontal axis of risk, i.e., the expected shortfall or the first partial moment in Exhibit 7, where the risk measure is scaled such that the largest value is equal to one.
By varying the value of A, we increase or decrease the investors aversion towards risk, which in this case is expressed in terms of having negative returns. If A is very large, the investor is only interested in avoiding losses. In this case, the optimal portfolio fixim our methodology, denoted as Portfolio C, has XiWi.} in stocks, 70% in bonds, and 20% in hedge funds. Portfolio C is analogous to the global niinimuin variance portfolio in the niean-variancc optimization.
A portfolio that is not on this efficient frontier in Exhibit 7 is the baseline 60% stocks -40% bonds porttblio from endnote I. It is clear that one can improve tlie porttblio etliciency in two directions. First, the efficient portfolio that has the same probability of outperformance as the 6O' Xr-4O% portfolio, but with less risk, is Portfolio A with 30% in stocks, 28% in bonds, and 42% in hedge fonds. Portfolio A preserves the probability of outperformance, but reduces the risk measure by 50%. Second, the portfolio with the same risk but higher probability ot outperformance is Portfolio B with 27% in stocks. 1% in bonds, and 72% in hedge flinds.
WHO WOULD AND WOULD NOT INVEST IN HEDGE FUNDS?
Thus far, we define risk by the investors aversion to average losses, which is the first partial moment. We now consider a more general risk term, which is K-th partial moment in our model. In other words, we allow investors who are worried about losses relative to a benchmark to penalize large losses more stridently as K grows, capturing the semivariance with K -2, the third moment (related to skewness) with K= 3, and the fourth moment (related to kurtosis-fear of an extreme negative event) with K = 4. The model becomes:
The first case, that is for K-1, was presented in the previous section. Using simulations, we can approximately identify the efficient frontiers for K>2. Exhibit H shows the efficient frontiers for K equal to 2, 3, and 4, respectively. These graphs indicate that as K increases, the investor becomes more concerned about events far out in the left tail. As a consequence, allocation to hedge funds decreases. This is visually depicted by the relative position of the 60%-40% portfolio. As K increases, the 60%-40% portfolio moves closer to the efficient frontier. One can speculate that there exists a value of X, probably very large, for which the 60'>o-40% portfolio will become efficient.
If we continue to expand the definition of risk in terms of the K-th partial momt'nt, it will become clear that only investors who seek to avoid any extreme event with hedge fUnds would prefer the traditional 60%-40% portfolio to portfolios with hedge funds. Those investors are willing to accept the variance inherent in the 6()%i allocation to stocks and lower their chances of beating the benchmark of 12%.
Allocations to tbe three asset classes for different risk measures are presented in Exhibit 9. The portfolios in Exhibit 9a are chosen from the set of efficient portfolios that have the same probability of outperforming 12% as the standard 60%-40% portfolio. As the risk measure changes {K > 1), allocation to hedge funds decreases. However, in the case of JC = 4, the allocation is 21%, still a substantial allocation. Thus, it is fair to conclude that as long as the investor is comfortable with being protected against the first four partial moments, an allocation to hedge funds is efficient. Of course, if the investor wants more protection against rare events, allociition to hedge funds may not be appropriate. Our analysis also sho\vs that transferring half of the allocation from stocks to hedge funds decreases risk substantially relative to that of the 6()"Ai-40% portfolio. For example, the reduction in risk is 35% (58%) when the hedge fund allocation is 21% (42%) and the stock allocation is 41% (30%) compared to 60% in the baseline portfoho.
The portfolios in Exhibit 9b are chosen from the set of efficient portfolios that have the same risk as the standard 6O' X)-4{)% portfolio. We see a similar declining allocation to hedge funds as K increases. The starting allocation in hedge funds (K = 1) is much greater than that in Exhibit 9a. This is due to the fact that we are now considering portfolios that will bring us closer to the goal of outperforming 12%. Hence, our risk aversion is low. Note that unlike in Exhibit 9a, the transfer of weight is from bonds to hedge funds. The 38% allocation in hedge funds (the last row of Exhibit 9b (K -4) ) is the portfolio on the efficient frontier that corresponds to a smaller value of the risk aversion parameter compared to the value of the risk aversion parameter for the portfolio with 21% in hedge funds in Exhibit 9a. The increase in the probability of outperformance is mainly due to the increase in the allocation to hedge funds.
In summary, by transferring almost half of the allocation from bonds to hedge funds, the probability of EXHIBIT outpertbrniing a 12% benchmark compared to the probability of the 60%-40% portfolio increases. For example, tbe increase in the probability of outperformance is 9% (4%) when the hedge fund allocation is 72% (38%) and the stock allocation is 27% (48%) compared to 60% in tbe baseline portfolio.
CONSTRUCTING A FUND OF FUNDS
In this section, we demonstrate how to use the described methodology to construct a fund of funds with desired characteristics. We obtained the monthly hedge fund returns from tbe CISDM.'"We used tbe monthly returns from 1994-2003, which resulted in 120 monthly observations for every fund. We computed the average assets under management (AUM) for tbe funds tbat were still active in 2003 and with monthly returns reported as early as January 1994. We ranked the funds based on the average AUM and selected the largest 50 funds. The size of the selected funds ranges from $77 million to $1 billion.
Exhibit 10 presents the style, AUM, annualized monthly return, volatility, skewness, kurtosis, and Sbarpe ratio of the selected hedge funds for [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] ." The average returns vary hetween 5,33% and 26.24%, aniiuiiHzed volatility between 1.5% and 25.28%, skewness between -3.5 and 3.44, kurtosis between -0.33 and 24.97, and the Sharpe ratio between 0.21 and 2.21.'-It appears that some bedge 6and return distributions are different from the normal distribution.
Using the historical data, we constructed tbe mean-variance efficient frontier for the selected bedge funds presented in Exhibit 11. Exbihit 12 presents the mean-variance optimal portfolios for different values ot the riskfree rate. Tbe global minimum-variance portfolio bas an annual return of 7.8% with a volatility of 1.09%. At the 5% (10%) risk-free rate, the mean-variance optimal portfolio has an annual mean return of 10.98% (18.54%) and standard deviation of 1.65% (5.17%). We compare these portfolios witb the optimal portfolios produced by our methodology in the following analysis.
We used the methodology we have described to construct a fund of the selected 50 hedge tunds. To generate hedge fund returns scenarios, we used the procedure based on tbe Nelson-Cario methodology [1997] as described in Popova, Morton, and Popova |2OO6| and assumed that past hedge fund performance is representative of fiiture performance. Note that in the scenario generation process and hence the resulting optimal poitfolios, inputs to our methodology are Uiken from all moments of the return distribution. This is in contrast witb other methodologies, e.g., the mean-variance approach, where only two sample moments are computed from the historical return distribution. 19  20  21  22  23   24  25   26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39   40   41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50 Fund Style Annual Volatility (%)
We constructed four difFerent portfolios for the period from 1994 to 2003 using two benchmark risk-free rates {5% and 10%): two minimizing the expected shortfall with respect to the 5% and 10% risk-free rates, and two maximizing the probability of outperforming the 5% and 10% risk-free rates. Optimal portfolio weights ot these portfolios together with those for the mean-variance portfolios are presented in Exhibit 13.
Results in Exhibit 13 indicate that the meanvariance portfolios have fewer funds than the portfolios computed from our method. For example, for the 5% benchmark, the mean-variance portfolio has 16 funds (32% of all funds), whereas the minimum expected shortfall portfolio and the maximum probability portfolio has 26 flmds'' (52% of all funds) and 28 funds (58%. of all funds), respectively. For the more aggressive 10% benchmark, the difference is more pronounced: 11 funds (22% of all funds) are included m the mean-variance portfolio versus 25 funds (50% of all funds) in the minimum shortfall portfoho and 31 funds {62% of all funds) in the maximum probability portfolio.
To test the robustness of our methodology, we test the out-of-saniple performance of the constructed optimal portfohos for the year 2004. Results are presented in Exhibit 14 for the 5% benchmark; the realized Sortino ratios are 1.94, 2.37, and 2.63 for the mean-variance optimal portfolio, minimum shortfall portfolio, and maximum probability portfolio, respectively. Note that the higher Sortino ratios indicate that our methodology produces portfolios with the desired feature-skewing the return distributions to the right.
The resulting skewed return distributions can also be observed in Exhibit 15, which shows the out-of-sample return distribution densities for the optimal portfolios. The left panels (a-c) in Exhibit 15 show the densities for the mean-variance portfolio, minimum shortfall portfoho, and maximum probability portfolio for the 5% benchmark cases. As we move trom panel a to c, it is interesting to note that the return distribution shifts to the right, an indication of reduced lower-tail risk. LOO Exhibit 16 shows the profit and loss (P&L) plots for the different portfolios. For both benchmark cases, the nuximum probability portfolio achieves its goal, i.e., above 5% and 10% in one year. A caveat, however, is in order due to the small out-of-sample data set.
CONCLUSION
Return distributions of hedge funds are characterized by their non-normal properties. This non-normality presents difficulties to traditional mean-variance models for asset allocation, which tend to be overly aggressive in their allocation to hedge flinds. In this article, we introduce a more effective means of dealing with optimization with hedge funds. Using procedures from stochastic programming, our model is able to recognize and use all the information embedded in the return distribution of hedge funds.
We apply the model to examine the effects of the semi-variance, third, and fourth moments on portfolio allocation to hedge funds. Our results indicate a substantial allocation to hedge tunds is reasonable even with consideration for the highly unusual skewness and kurtosis, which is consistent with results from previous studies. We show how to use our methodology by constructing a fund of funds. Empirical results show that our methodology produces portfolios with desired features. Specitically, our portfoho return distributions skewed to the right relative to the mean-variance optimal portfolios, resulting in higher Sortino ratios. Additionally, an outot-sample backtest shows that our optimal portfolio achieves its goal-beating the selected benchmark.
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'This baseline portfolio has the maximum Sharpe ratio (at 4.25%) in a mean-variance optimization where the average monthly returns for U.S. equity and U.S. long-term bonds are 12.3% and 5.85%, respectively, and the volatilities are 20.20% and 9.24%, respectively, for the period 1926-2005. Data were taken from Ibbotson Associates [2006] .
Sometimes non-normality can occur due to certain outliers.
Survivor bias is estimated to have added 1.5% to 3.0%) to annual returns (e.g., Amin and Kat [2003] ). These numbers cannot be reliably conclusive due to the confounding effect of the inherent biases mentioned above. For example, many huge failed hedge fiinds did not report their performance to the databases.^A utocorrelation estimates in these previous studies have been calculated using low frequency data.
This upper bound is known as the "wait-and-see" bound in the parlance of stochastic programming.
''For a detailed description of the approximating model and approaches for solving it, see Popova, Morton, and Popova [2006] 'Reported statistics are based on monthly returns for the period from January 1988 to April 2001.
"We used S&P 500 monthly returns for 1990-2000 to simulate the returns for Asset 1 and generate the returns of Asset 2 based on the same first two moments of Asset 1.
As noted earlier, autocorrelations in previous studies have been calculated using low frequency data.
"The database has information on more than 6,000 funds (CTA and CPO included) with price histories starting as early as 1979. The total number of hedge funds (closed and active) is 3,271. As of the end of 2004, there are 1,334 active funds.
"We used the 3-month Treasury constant maturity rate as the proxy for the risk-free rate of return. For the period 1994-2003, the average rate is 4.22%.
'^he S&P 5OO' s Sharpe ratio for the same period is 0.29. '^We counted Rinds that have more than 1% allocation ill the optimal portfolio. The same rule is used for all four portfohos.
